California's Court of Appeal Re-Confirms Need for Substantial Evidence in Psychiatric Injury Cases

By Jeffrey Stander, SRTK

Given the wide-ranging proliferation of psychiatric injury claims, and the resulting increase in costs borne by the CA employers, the Legislature, more than 28 years ago, expressed its intention to “establish a new and higher threshold for” these types of claims. Thus, it required that, in order for a psychiatric injury claim to be compensable:
  • The employee prove that there was a diagnosable mental disorder that was productive of disability (Labor Code Section 3208.3(a))
  • The employee demonstrate that actual events of the employment were the predominant cause of the psychiatric injury (Labor Code Section 3208.3(b))
  • Claims of psychiatric injury made by individuals employed less than six months would be precluded, unless the injury was caused by sudden and extraordinary employment conditions (Labor Code Section 3208.3(d))
  • Post-termination psychiatric claims would be unsuccessful, absent proof of several exceptions (Labor Code Section 3208.3(e)) 
  • No compensable psychiatric injury would exist where the trauma was substantially caused by a lawful, non-discriminatory, good faith personnel action (Labor Code Section 3208.3(h)). 
For the past three decades, applicants’ attorneys have been attempting to exploit and expand the exceptions to these constraints in order to provide their clients with benefits and disregard the Legislature’s intention.

Fortunately, on January 30, 2018, the Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, issued its decision in State Compensation Insurance Fund v WCAB (Guzman), which re-confirmed the substantial quantity and quality of evidence required of the employee to prove an exception to the Legislature’s preclusion of psychiatric injury claims.

Mr. Guzman was employed as a laborer for less than six months by Carmel Valley Construction. On the day of the incident, he was operating a 95-pound soil compactor on a hillside when the machine struck a rock, which caused the employee to fall and the machine to be catapulted in the air, ultimately falling on Mr. Guzman, causing him to sustain a serious back injury, which necessitated the performance of two surgeries. He also alleged that the injury caused psychiatric injury for which he received treatment.

During the course of Trial, Mr. Guzman testified in a fashion which the Trial Judge deemed to be “credible, uncontradicted and unrebutted.” The employee claimed he had previously operated soil compactors, that he had never heard of anyone having such a machine fall on the operator and that he had never lost control of a soil compactor before the incident in question. The Trial Court, in finding that Mr. Guzman sustained a psychiatric injury, contended that the incident was caused by a sudden and extraordinary employment condition. Defendant’s Petition for Reconsideration was denied.

The DCA, after thoroughly reviewing the Legislature’s intent underlying Labor Code Section 3208.3, focused on the meaning of the exception to the six-month rule: that the injury be caused by a sudden and extraordinary employment condition. After stating the dictionary definitions of the terms “sudden” (not foreseen or prepared) and “extraordinary” (going beyond what is usual, regular, common or customary), the Appellate Court cited two cases that applied these terms to deny the less than six month employee’s claim of having sustained a psychiatric injury. In Matea v WCAB (2006) 144 Cal. App. 4th 1435, where the employee was struck by a rack of falling lumber in a store aisle, and, in State Compensation Insurance Fund v WCAB (Garcia) (2012) 204 Cal. App. 4th 766, where the worker fell from a 24-foot ladder while picking avocados, were both deemed not to constitute sudden and extraordinary employment conditions precipitating the psychiatric injury. In the Guzman matter, the DCA stated that it was Mr. Guzman’s obligation to prove, beyond a preponderance of the evidence, that the injurious event was caused by sudden and extraordinary employment conditions. The Appellate Court bluntly stated that the employee failed to sustain his burden. He failed to prove that the injury was not the result of a routine type of employment event that all individuals similarly situated would experience. He failed to provide any evidence that it was uncommon for a compactor to be catapulted in the air when striking a rock below the surface. The fact that he never had such an experience would be irrelevant. The key focus should have been on the extraordinary nature of such an incident occurring to any individual. Additionally, the incident was not sudden because he had been operating the machine in the specific location for at least 30 minutes. Accordingly, the action was remanded to the WCAB with directions to deny Mr. Guzman’s claim for psychiatric injury.

Note that this decision was unpublished. As such, it could not have been cited, pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 8.1115(a). Given the importance of this case, Defendant filed a Petition for Publication with the Court of Appeal on February 15, 2018. It was published last week.

The rationale contained in this case can be utilized to demonstrate that a less than six-month employee failed to prove the existence of a “sudden and extraordinary” employment condition that caused the psychiatric injury. Specifically, it is the employee who is required to prove each and every element of this exception. The employee will not prevail simply by alleging that the employer failed to prove foreseeability of the event. Moreover, the employee’s personal experience as to which constitutes an “extraordinary” condition is irrelevant. He/she must affirmatively prove that the event was something other than routine type of employment condition to which all employees within their first six months on the job would experience.

=====================================================================

R. Jeffrey Stander is Of Counsel to Stander Reubens Thomas Kinsey. Prior to joining the firm in 1982, he was associated with law firms exclusively handling workers' compensation and general civil matters, and acting as in-house counsel for Western Employers' Insurance Company. Mr. Stander is a Certified Specialist in Workers' Compensation law, a member of the Assessment Committee of the Lawyers’ Assistance Program for the State Bar of California, and has been an instructor for the Insurance Educational Association. He received his Bachelor’s degree from the University of Southern California and his Juris Doctor degree from the University of San Fernando Valley College of Law.  (www.srtklaw.com/attorneys)


Comments